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Ranking and benchmarking: The political logic of 
new regulatory instruments in the fields of gender 
equality and anti-corruption
Anna van der Vleuten and Mieke Verloo
New regulatory instruments such as benchmarking, ranking and best practices have 
given new meaning to the old politics of reputation and changed the standards by which 
performance is judged. In this article, we investigate the power-based mechanisms that 
operate between reputation, ranking, benchmarking and performance. Analysing two 
cases – gender equality policies at EU level and the fight against corruption at the global 
level – we show that there are valid reasons to doubt the contribution of ranking and 
benchmarking to improving policy making. The underlying political dynamics even result 
in adverse effects on performance in terms of legitimacy and effectiveness.
A political discussion of new regulatory instruments
Since the 1980s, New Public Management (NPM) and its associated doctrines of 
public accountability and organisational best practice have given birth to a large array 
of new regulatory instruments meant to improve the performance and the political 
accountability of public administration systems (de Vries, 2005). Some argue that 
these innovations have made ‘public management in most OECD [Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development] countries more efficient, more 
transparent and customer-oriented, more flexible, and more focused on performance’ 
(Haque, 2007: 181). Others blame NPM for its adverse effects on the quality of 
service delivery and the downsizing of public employment. Discussions of NPM 
have often been technical, aiming to improve the quality of the instruments, or 
ideological, criticising its market-centric neoliberal assumptions (Haque, 2007). 
What is lacking is a political discussion of NPM. Caporaso and Wittenbrinck 
(2006: 476) are right in pointing out that this new mode of governance ‘is itself a 
political act’, but they limit their discussion of the political dimension to the shift 
from majority voting to consensus. Of course, there is more to the political nature 
of NPM than voting rules. We argue that an analysis of the power-based logic 
underlying these instruments will enable us to better understand why they often 
produce perverse effects and undermine the quality and transparency of policy 
making instead of improving it. We focus on two sets of instruments: policy steering 
through ‘pioneer standard setting’ (benchmarking, targets and pilot projects) and 
enforcement through ‘relative standard setting’ (ranking of performance and peer 
review). 
These instruments are widely applied not only in the national context, 
transforming in the 1980s for instance the American and the British civil services 
(Majone, 1997), but also internationally. We will explore their application in the 
international arena, where political authority is decentralised and accordingly the 
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power-based logic is revealed even more clearly than elsewhere. We have selected two 
cases, gender equality and the fight against corruption, which deal with European 
policy making and global policy making respectively. Since they concern different 
policy arenas, we will be able to show how these new regulatory instruments lead 
to similar consequences in spite of institutional differences. The choice of policy 
issues has been guided by our assumption that the perverse effects are stronger if 
the issue is perceived to be more ideological than technical. In that respect, gender 
equality and anti-corruption constitute domains par excellence, as good performance 
in these fields contributes to the reputation of a state as a ‘good guy’. 
Old and new regulatory instruments and their power-based 
logics
New regulatory instruments differ from old-style politics in many respects, of which 
three are particularly relevant here. They concern the definition or representation 
of the problem, the choice of the problem-solving strategy and the enforcement 
of the solution.
The ‘old’ instruments of international governance were clearly power based as 
the definition of the problem as well as the choice of problem-solving strategies 
were made through political bargains ‘negotiated tooth and claw by groups with 
conflicting objectives, accompanied of course by winners and losers’ (Caporaso 
and Wittenbrinck, 2006: 476). Enforcement was obtained through the ‘politics of 
reputation’. States value their reputation; it is part of their power position with 
regard to domestic society and to other states. Reputation is based primarily on 
the quality of past performance. If a state has built up trust, it can convince others 
of the quality of its ideas more easily and will be more successful in promoting its 
model. Conversely, ‘being perceived as a cheater and free-rider’ undermines the 
state’s bargaining power (Börzel, 2003: 203) and the attractiveness of its practices. 
A state’s interest in a good reputation thus contributes to investments in better 
performance and plays a role in explaining state compliance with international 
standards, particularly regarding issues such as gender equality and corruption that 
are linked to its identity as a ‘good state’ (van der Vleuten, 2005). 
If a state is unwilling to implement an international standard in these domains, 
it will prefer its non-compliance to go unnoticed. Accordingly, international 
organisations have set up monitoring systems, increasing the probability that non-
compliance is discovered. In the European Union (EU), the Commission is entitled to 
investigate whether a state rhetoric corresponds with the facts, and to sanction non-
compliance by bringing a state before the European Court of Justice. Member states 
strongly dislike such procedures, since the Commission usually wins the case and 
Court rulings receive a great deal of publicity, especially when financial sanctions are 
imposed. The involvement of the Court implies that an absolute standard is applied, 
meaning that a third party provides the final interpretation of a rule that is applicable 
to all member states, business and citizens. Also, in its interpretations, the Court takes 
into account the shared understandings of member states as regards the issue at hand. 
The strengths of these ‘old school’ politics of reputation thus are constituted by the 
reliance on absolute standards that are authoritatively interpreted and enforced by 
a third party, transparency, and the high reputation costs of non-compliance. Other 
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international organisations do not have such strong tools for authoritative standard 
setting and enforcement at their disposal, however. Also, the system suffers from 
another weakness: the judgement of performance is strictly formal, assessing the 
legal implementation of a standard, which often does not adequately reflect the 
de facto attainment of the policy goal contained in the standard (Lombardo, 2003).
New regulatory instruments aim to repair such weaknesses. They tend to be 
presented ‘in a positive normative light’, suggesting that the processes of problem 
definition and problem solving represent a break with authoritative forms of policy 
making and are characterised by deliberation and the bottom-up involvement of 
social actors (Caporaso and Wittenbrinck, 2006: 476). Let us take a closer look at 
some new instruments. 
Best practice is one such new instrument. Best practices are assumed to offer the 
best solution to a problem, and are presented as a model to be copied in other states 
or situations. This method does not result in an absolute standard, but in what we 
have dubbed a ‘pioneer standard’. A pioneer standard is a context-specific way of 
coping with a problem that is dressed up as an absolute standard without specifying 
the scope conditions that facilitated its success. Although it is no absolute standard, 
all parties involved are urged to follow the pioneer and apply its methods. However, 
the effectiveness of this urge is limited, since non-conformity cannot lead to coercive 
measures and shaming will be of limited use, as the development of different practices 
does not necessarily preclude solving the problem for which the best practice was 
recommended. Therefore, the links between best practice and reputation are not 
straightforward. The connection may even be reversed, since producing best practices 
not only contributes to good reputations, but good reputations also produce best 
practices. In sociology, this is known as the ‘Matthew effect’, which ‘consists in the 
accruing of greater increments of recognition for particular scientific contributions 
to scientists of considerable repute and the withholding of such recognition from 
scientists who have not yet made their mark’ (Merton, 1968: 58). In fact, to deck out 
a new strategy, officials will collect best practices before any practice even exists. If 
they base their selection on proposals by government representatives, ideas proposed 
by states with a good reputation in the field are more likely to receive the best 
practice label than ideas proposed by notorious laggards.  
Ranking is an instrument meant to improve compliance with policy goals. It works 
through the establishment of indicators. Instead of laying down a legal standard, 
policy goals are disaggregated in quantifiable objectives, and based on their score on 
such indicators, states may then be ranked and classified as pioneers or laggards. This 
means that a relative standard is applied. Policy makers and experts decide which 
aspects of performance will be measured. As different states will be at an advantage 
or disadvantage depending on the chosen ways of measuring, it then matters which 
procedures are adopted to select indicators, and who has the power to decide which 
data are to be produced. Rather than developing the indicators in a transparent 
democratic debate, there is a tendency to leave this to experts, based on a strong 
‘faith in the power of expertise’ (Majone, 1997: 152). For the sake of comparison, the 
ranking objectives tend to be one-dimensionally quantified, and indicators selected 
on the basis of the availability of data. This may lead to the ‘stretching and bending’ 
of policy objectives to fit the available data (Lombardo et al, 2009). Another pitfall 
is the phenomenon of ‘reactivity’, in which actors strategically play into indicators 
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to raise their scores, regardless of whether they actually perform well (Espeland and 
Sauder, 2007).
In short, there are no standards resulting from negotiations between state 
representatives and interpretations by judges, but only relative and pioneer standards 
resulting from technocratic exercises. Experts and the availability of data will define 
the problem. This of course casts doubts as regards the legitimacy of the problem 
definition and raises questions as to who can be hold accountable. The next sections 
on European gender equality policies and global anti-corruption policies will 
highlight the political dynamics involved in new regulatory instruments, distorting 
the link between performance and reputation.
Promoting gender equality in the European arena
Gender equality is a domain in which, for more than 50 years, the EU has strongly 
influenced national policies, especially through legislation that focused on the 
labour market. The European Commission and the Court monitored and enforced 
compliance, sometimes succeeding in forcing unwilling states to implement the 
European rules (van der Vleuten, 2007). In the 1990s, a shift took place from legal 
instruments to instruments such as ranking and best practices under the label of the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC) (Héritier, 2003). 
The OMC was formally introduced in 1997 in the Treaty of Amsterdam as 
part of the European Employment Strategy (EES). This strategy was developed 
in order to tackle high unemployment across Europe without transferring any 
real policy-making powers to the European level (Mosher and Trubek, 2003). It 
asks European government leaders to approve policy guidelines, for example on 
equal opportunity policies to promote gender equality. The guidelines have to 
be implemented by the OMC, a method that relies on soft mechanisms such as 
peer review and benchmarking. It aims to promote mutual learning and foster the 
generation and diffusion of new ideas and practices across Europe. To that effect, 
the European Commission identifies successful member states and incorporates 
their practices in the guidelines. After the Council of Ministers has approved the 
guidelines and set targets, each member state draws up a National Action Plan, 
presenting its strategies to reach the targets. Progress is monitored through peer 
review. Each year the Commission examines compliance with the guidelines 
and proposes recommendations to individual member states. The assessments and 
recommendations are included in the Joint Employment Report, which leads to 
a renewed identification of best practices, and to a new start of the cycle (Mosher 
and Trubek, 2003). There are fierce debates as to whether or not the European 
Employment Strategy is delivering on its promises (Héritier, 2003; Pfister, 2008). 
Here we will focus on the consequences of the use of indicators and benchmarking 
for performance in the field of gender equality. 
Defining the problem
The EES has resulted in an ongoing production of member state rankings on 
employment-related issues. The most important targets formulated in the domain 
of gender equality are those concerning women’s employment and unemployment 
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rates, gender gaps in pay, and the provision of childcare. Although measuring the 
performance on the chosen indicators seems to ‘prove’ which states are doing well, 
and which states are underperforming, the method suffers from several biases. 
States have different ways to frame gender inequality as a policy problem and define 
gender equality as a goal (Bacchi, 1999; Verloo, 2007), but these differences tend 
to disappear as the definitions are made dependent on the availability of data. This 
means that we find more indices on gender inequality in the public sector than in 
the private domain, more indicators on numbers of women than on empowerment 
of women in the sense of giving voice to non-hegemonic actors in a society (Verloo, 
2005). As a result, the indices, although they aim to measure progress towards gender 
equality, measure simple inclusion instead of structural progress. 
The use of indices contributes to a ‘uni-dimensionalisation’ of the gender 
inequality problématique in two ways: the complex interrelationships between gender 
inequalities in citizenship, labour and intimacy are not captured anywhere (Verloo, 
2007), and women are treated as a unitary category rather than as a category also 
constituted by its intersections with other inequalities (class, race/ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, age, physical ability). Limiting the quality of performance to targets 
that are measured by mono-dimensional indices leads national authorities to focus 
on the production of documents on these indices. This redefines the problem of 
gender inequality as a technical problem in the sense of missing data and expertise, 
and incentivises improving the quality of the documents on gender equality 
instead of improving gender equality itself. This is one form of ‘reactivity’ that is 
counterproductive to performance (Espeland and Sauder, 2007).
Limiting the assessment of performance to indices and targets may lead to 
misleading conclusions. In one case, the EU praised Greece for closing the gender 
employment gap, disregarding the fact that Greece achieved this thanks to a drop 
in the male employment rate (Rubery, 2005). Similarly, changes in the segregation 
index were interpreted as progress in desegregating labour markets, without these 
changes being decomposed into effects related to, respectively, changes in the labour 
force and changing gender shares within occupational categories (Rubery, 2005).
Although there is good reason to complain about the lack of indices (Luxembourg 
Presidency Report, 2005), we argue that the main problem is not the mere number 
of indices, but the implicit and explicit selection mechanisms that underlie the 
choice of indices. Certain fields of gender equality are given more importance than 
others. The most developed indices are found in the economic field, encompassing 
aspects of education, social inclusion and poverty (Walby, 2005), while the fields 
of citizenship and gender-based violence are largely ignored. This bias not only 
influences the rankings that result from the indices, but also the politics of reputation. 
In 2000, for instance, the traditional laggard Austria developed a law on domestic 
violence based on an innovative model of state intervention in this field. Not until 
six years later, the Netherlands – an alleged pioneer – introduced similar legislation. 
Still, introducing its law early has not changed Austria’s reputation as a laggard in 
gender equality policies. This may be connected to the fact that there are no targets 
or indices on gender violence.
A classic ‘technocratic’ complaint would be that the EES indices are not well 
constructed. Indeed, different indices can produce different rankings. An index 
based on the equal opportunity indices from the EES would put the usual laggards 
6 Anna van der Vleuten and Mieke Verloo
Policy & Politics (2011) • 10.1332/030557310X550097
Portugal and Belgium ahead of gender pioneers Denmark and Sweden, and would 
put the usually high-ranking Finland in ninth place (Plantenga et al, 2003: 21). A 
different index, based on a set of indices that includes aspects of political and private 
contexts, presents a ranking that fits the classical expectations of ‘good’ gender 
equality states, listing Sweden, Denmark and Finland in the top three (Plantenga 
et al, 2003: 37). The point here is not to argue about the respective qualities of 
indices, but to accentuate that every choice for one over the other has substantial 
implications for states’ ranking, as well as for policy recommendations to improve 
one’s performance.  
Relative standard setting, pioneer standard setting and compliance 
The EES targets do not constitute an absolute standard based on a consensus over 
which situation is good or bad, the way in which legal instruments define certain 
practices as illegal. They constitute relative standards indicating that providing 
childcare for 33% of the youngest children is better than, say, 21%, but this does not 
mean that 33% is in itself a good or 21% a bad situation. Therefore, these targets 
are arbitrary standards for judging performance. How then to adequately judge 
state behaviour? In addition, these are not de facto targets for everyone, as some 
member states are outperforming them from the start. These member states are not 
compelled to undertake further action, as they do not face an absolute standard 
with which to comply. Rönnblom (2004: 2) notes how Sweden proudly presents 
itself as the ‘most gender equal country in the world’, thereby legitimising its 
inaction. Relative targets may legitimise inaction not only by the leaders but also 
by the laggards. As Mósesdóttir (2006: 53) argues, ranking runs the risk of ‘making 
those countries that outperform the others the unachievable standard for member 
countries falling behind. Economic, political and social contexts cannot be copied 
over night’. ‘Laggard’ Italy, for instance, reports that the EES guidelines are ineffective 
because they are not appropriate for the Italian labour market (Mosher and Trubek, 
2003). As a result, the annual EES scoreboard shows persistent classes of leaders (the 
Scandinavian countries) and laggards (the Mediterranean countries) without the 
latter catching up with the former. 
Another building block of the EES is the production of best practices. Member 
states are ‘encouraged to benchmark their performance against the best performer in 
the Union’ (Héritier, 2003: 117). This implies that one national solution is considered 
the best. Yet, the selection of the best practice is a political and not a technical 
exercise, as it does not consist of questioning all practices and investigating which 
practice suits which context best. Networks of gender experts assist the European 
Commission in the assessment of member state performance. They are a source of 
‘labelling’ best practices and they create pioneers in the process. In their review of 
all the performed European gender impact assessments (GIAs), Rubery and Fagan 
(2000) position the Netherlands as an early starter. They then incorporate the 
Dutch conceptual framework as an academic model for what they recommend as 
a required further conceptual and practical elaboration of the GIA methodology. 
In practice, though, the Dutch GIA methodology has proven to be difficult to 
export because it is tailored to Dutch data and Dutch framing of gender equality 
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(Roggeband and Verloo, 2006). This shows that best practices have little value if 
they are not contextualised.
Compliance through policy learning and shaming 
The process of peer review presumes that member states perceive themselves as a 
collective that is eager to learn. However, member states often have not been eager 
to call into question their national practices. It has been the enforcement procedures 
involving the Commission and the Court that have forced them to do so more than 
once. In the 1980s, for instance, the Dutch and British governments had to revise 
their breadwinner-centred systems of social security thoroughly in order to comply 
with a European directive that ruled out discrimination in social security (van der 
Vleuten, 2007). If instead of being taken to court they had been asked to imitate the 
Danish best practice of an individualised social security system, Dutch and British 
representatives probably would have explained that in their national context the 
breadwinner system was the best practice to ensure an equitable family income. The 
domestic political and economic costs involved in policy change would have severely 
limited their presumed ‘eagerness to learn’. Why would these national officials and 
politicians want to be driven by mimesis when facing domestic opposition? 
The only other instrument available to make member states comply is to designate 
them as ‘villains’ or ‘heroes’ (Barysch et al, 2008). However, as we have argued already, 
a top ranking does not always mean that the state has behaved heroically, and a 
low-ranking state has not necessarily behaved like a villain, since member states 
may have done their best in spite of unfavourable conditions or may have rested 
on their laurels in spite of favourable conditions. For an underperforming state, 
the reputational costs of the EES remain limited, as long as it is all about relative 
standards without a third party authoritatively assessing performance as compliance 
or non-compliance. How would shaming bring gender-traditional Malta, where the 
gender gap in employment rates is as high as 37% (measured in full-time equivalent), 
to join Finland and Latvia, where the gap is less than 8% (EC, 2009)? 
One may wonder whether the old system was effective. The answer is to a certain 
extent equivocal. France, for instance, cherishes its reputation as a social role model. 
From the very beginnings of the European integration process, it has been vocal 
about gender equality (van der Vleuten, 2007). Just when France occupied the EU 
presidency, in spring 2000, the European Court was on the verge of condemning it 
to a daily fine of 142,425 euros if it failed to lift the ban on night work for women. 
The French government succeeded in convincing its utterly divided Parliament of 
the necessity to act immediately by pointing at the consequences for its reputation. 
To be the first member state ever to be condemned to a penalty payment by 
the European Court over gender equality policy was unbearable for a would-be 
champion of equality like France (van der Vleuten, 2007). As a result, France complied 
by lifting the ban on night work. In fact, this is a telling example of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the legal system: compliance with the standard was obtained and 
legal discrimination eliminated, but the labour conditions of many French women 
deteriorated as they now had to accept night shifts.
In their review of the EES, Mosher and Trubek (2003: 78) found that some policy 
changes ‘came about because exchange of information and deliberation within the 
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EES process brought new ideas to the fore’. For controversial policies, however, 
the political mandate remains decisive (de la Porte and Nanz, 2004). In addition, 
the annual peer review process does not seem to encourage learning in the sense 
of developing shared discourses and diffusing knowledge, since less than an hour is 
allocated for the presentation and discussion of each National Action Plan. Some 
member states treat the presentation of the National Action Plans as a bureaucratic 
reporting task instead of an opportunity for reflection (Mosher and Trubek, 2003). 
As the monitoring and the ensuing naming and shaming do not focus on the process 
but on the outcome, not the learning process but the production of the ‘correct’ 
information becomes the key objective. Member states only have an interest in 
producing data instead of adopting an open attitude towards each others’ practices, 
turning the OMC into a ‘mere beauty contest’ or ‘an exercise in statistics’ (Borrás 
and Jacobsson, 2004: 195).  
Transparency and accountability
Until the 1990s, the public accountability of EU politics was contested, because 
decision-making powers were concentrated in the hands of a Council of Ministers 
that deliberated behind closed doors. The introduction of the co-decision procedure 
in 1992, which gave the directly elected European Parliament a formal say, has 
strongly improved political accountability. The European Court and the national 
courts jointly assured judicial accountability. Although the increase of transparency 
and accountability was another objective of NPM, the introduction of new regulatory 
instruments has actually reduced accountability, because the European Court is not 
involved in the interpretation of the ‘soft law’ standards that result from the OMC 
(Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004). Member states do not have the option to challenge 
their ranking in court. Political accountability is problematic as well, as the European 
Parliament is only involved in strict advisory terms. At the national level, there is 
no public debate about the EES; we see only sparse coverage in the national media, 
parliamentary debates have been quite low key, also due to a lack of knowledge of 
the OMC among parliamentarians, and the participation of civil society organisations 
is very limited (de la Porte and Nanz, 2004).
Fighting corruption in the global arena
Compared with the EU, global international organisations lack the coercive tools 
to effect policy change. Of course, there are international tribunals that act as 
authoritative third-party standard setters, but they depend on states for enforcement. 
The observed shift to instruments such as ranking and benchmarking can be seen as 
one way for international organisations to deal with this enforcement problem. Also, 
these instruments seem to suit the normative power of international organisations 
based on impartiality and technocratic expertise (Joachim et al, 2008). A field in 
which ranking and benchmarking have proliferated is the promotion of good 
governance, including the fight against corruption by international organisations 
such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the OECD. They 
use corruption indexes and ranking as policy instruments. We argue that these 
instruments are more political than they might seem to be. 
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Nowadays, the fight against corruption ranks high on the global political agenda. 
During the Cold War, geopolitical motives strongly influenced decisions concerning 
loans by international financial institutions and bilateral financial aid. Since the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, other considerations such as accountability, transparency and 
legitimacy of government in the receiving countries have become more relevant to 
many donors (Lambsdorff, 1999). The careful assessment of the quality of governance 
has thus become of utmost importance, as it influences the attractiveness of a 
country for public and private financial institutions. The Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) is one of the instruments used worldwide to rank countries in terms 
of the extent to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and 
politicians. It is published yearly by Transparency International (TI), a global civil 
society organisation based in Berlin. 
The OECD praises the CPI as a useful tool that has ‘provided the basis for 
substantive anti-corruption reforms in a number of countries’ (Clarke, 2000). The 
idea behind the index is to stigmatise countries in the lower regions of the ranking, 
and discourage multinational corporations and aid-granting agencies to invest in 
these countries. This makes it a potentially far more powerful tool than the gender 
equality rankings discussed in the previous section, because a bad score on the CPI 
can have negative financial consequences. Hence, it matters tremendously how 
such indices are constructed. Despite the praise of the OECD, the CPI suffers from 
several weaknesses.  
Defining the problem and setting the standard
An impartial assessment of corruption would require a definition of corrupt practices 
that focuses on practices harming the quality of governance, and that takes into 
account institutional differences between countries. The CPI defines corruption 
as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’ (Clarke, 2000). This standard suffers 
from two biases, which both deflect damage to the reputation of wealthy OECD 
countries and undermine the reputation of poor and non-Western countries. First, 
it focuses on those forms of corruption that predominately occur in countries 
characterised by a high degree of state intervention in the economy. Only illegal 
private-to-public transactions are defined as corruption. The policies of so-called 
tax havens, which have deliberately established a tax structure and financial secrecy 
to take advantage of the worldwide demand for tax avoidance opportunities, are 
not identified as corrupt. These states harm the financial interests of other states, 
yet are not considered to be corrupt. This implies that those practices are singled 
out as corrupt that take place predominately in non-Western and poor countries, 
while practices in Western and wealthy countries (Singapore, Switzerland) are not 
labelled as corrupt. TI’s definition of corruption thus both reflects and strengthens 
unequal power relations. 
Second, the CPI only shows the receiving end (public authorities), while it 
leaves out the bribe payers (notably companies from leading industrial countries). 
In 1999, TI therefore established a new ranking, the Bribe Payers Index, assessing 
the propensity of companies to bribe abroad. It reveals poor compliance with the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention by companies based in OECD countries. Striking 
are the poor rankings of France and Italy (Transparency International, 2006). The 
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Bribe Payers Index thus seems to be an improvement; however, the score of a 
country in this index and its score in the CPI are not combined into a single ranking 
on corruption. As such, the Bribe Payers Index currently does not have the same 
potential material consequences as the CPI. 
Furthermore, the TI ranking may reflect reputation rather than performance. This is 
due to the data collection method; as indicated by its name – Corruption Perceptions 
Index –, the index is not established by listing corrupt practices directly, but indirectly, 
based on the perception of corruption by a set of correspondents. In effect, the index 
is a ‘poll of polls’. It compiles the results of 17 surveys among experts and business 
elite. These surveys asked them to assess the extent of corruption in the countries 
where their company is active. These data are then generalised to the country as a 
whole. While this use of as many different possible sources may give an impression 
of democratic standard setting, we argue that appearances are misleading. Even if 
all surveys involve a mix of residents and non-residents of the assessed country, all 
respondents share a predominately Western background and work in the Western 
business world, thus representing a specific elite. Their perception of corruption 
may be biased, reflecting their culturally coloured definition of what constitutes 
corrupt practices. A more heterogeneous group of respondents in terms of level 
of education, gender, and professional and cultural background might perceive the 
level of corruption in a country differently (van Hulten, 2007). 
The subjective character of the specific collected data is problematic as well. 
Clearly, corruption assessment lacks objective measurements (such as financial 
audits and court cases), but not all subjective measurements are problematic to the 
same extent. Perception-based indicators may gain in accuracy if they ask specific 
questions linked to real experiences instead of vague and general questions about 
the level of corruption in a certain country. Yet, only one organisation asks the 
respondents directly about their own experiences of corruption (Fjeldstad and 
Andvig, 2001), all other surveys used by TI consist of general questionnaires. This 
increases the probability that they measure the perception of reputation instead of 
the perception of corruption.
The variance in scores confirms the measurements’ subjectivity. Different surveys 
produce different results for the same country, ranging as wide as from 4.9 (corrupt) 
to 9.2 (almost clean) for the United States (US) in 2003.1 TI calculates the average to 
establish the country score. This resulted in a US score of 7.5, ranking 18th instead 
of 7th immediately behind Sweden (9.3) or sharing the 39th place with Tunisia (4.9) 
(Transparency International, 2007). Why would the average rather than the lower 
or the higher of these scores provide us with a correct representation of a country’s 
level of corruption? As Urra (2007: 6) points out, ‘complex statistical constructions of 
modern aggregate indicators can easily create an illusion of quantitative sophistication 
that leads to interpret them as actual corruption indicators’, but they still remain 
subjective indicators of perceived corruption.2  
Compliance through shaming
The TI index clearly exposes the shortcomings of rankings based on relative standard 
setting as a tool to improve performance through naming and shaming. In fact, it is 
unclear what the meaning of any ranking on the index is. Ranking 18th does not 
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mean that the country is twice as corrupt as number nine. A lower ranking than the 
previous year does not necessarily imply that the level of corruption has increased. 
In 2002, the United Kingdom (UK) ranked 10th, in 2003 it ranked 13th. Had it 
done worse? Perhaps not: it had scored the same in both years (8.7). If any change 
takes place, it is not clear when it happened, since respondents’ views are based on 
impressions that are not necessarily limited to the calendar year (Fjeldstad and Andvig, 
2001: 32). The addition of new countries to the index changes rankings without 
reflecting absolute change. In 1995, Indonesia ranked 41st (out of 41 countries) 
and in 2006 it ranked 130th (out of 163), but its score increased from 1.9 to 2.4. Of 
course, careful analysis shows whether this is a case of genuine improvement or not, 
but the point is that the results are often published without background information. 
Governments, opposition and media usually present changes in rankings to prove 
their respective cases and without applying the necessary caution.3 In the end, 
reputational costs are limited since a change in ranking can always be interpreted 
in more than one way.  
It is doubtful whether this index helps to improve performance. It has been 
published since 1995. Over the years, there has been no significant improvement in 
countries’ performance nor have there been any significant setbacks. The traditional 
high-flyers top the list (Scandinavian countries, New Zealand, Singapore) and the 
usual suspects fill the bottom league (African states, Haiti, Iraq, Myanmar). The 
distance between the lowest and the highest scores has not diminished. This might 
lead to the conclusion that the corruption level in individual countries changes 
very slowly over time. However, the impression of stagnation may also be due to 
methodological weaknesses linked to the previously mentioned subjective character 
of definition and data: the reputation of the CPI may influence people’s perceptions 
of the corruption level in a country, and thus ‘the most recent ranking may be highly 
dependent on previous rankings’ (Fjeldstad and Andvig, 2001: 32). We suspect that a 
state’s reputation immunises against change for better or worse, as it may be ‘easier’ 
to report corruption in countries known to have some, while reporting corruption 
in countries that are ‘known’ to be clean may have a higher threshold, calling for 
substantial proof. Tanzania’s poor ranking, for instance, did not improve in spite of the 
anti-corruption measures taken by President Mkapa, ‘Mr Clean’. The high rankings 
of France and Germany did not suffer from financial scandals involving high-ranking 
politicians including the President and the Chancellor respectively.4 Singapore and 
Switzerland are considered attractive destinations for funds and property investment 
precisely because no one asks where the money comes from and laws punishing 
tax fraud do not exist (van Hulten, 2007), but does this make them as clean as their 
high rankings suggest? Are these the best practices to be copied? The subjective 
character of the indicators thus undermines their utility as tools for policy change. 
What is more, two countries with similar rankings may suffer from different 
types of corruption; ‘sometimes politicians are bent and judges are straight; civil 
servants may be honest executors of a corrupt politician’s will; or the Minister 
may be honest, but officialdom crooked’ (The Economist, 2006). The CPI does not 
distinguish between grand and petty corruption, although the first is presumably 
more threatening to the economy than the latter (Fjeldstad and Andvig, 2001: 29). As 
a result, the ranking does not give information about the kind of measures most suited 
for fighting corruption and may even lead to perverse outcomes instead of actually 
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improving governance. For instance, government involvement in private markets 
is commonly seen as a source of corruption (although this does not hold true for 
Scandinavian countries), but deregulation is not necessarily a solution. Deregulation 
may even result in ‘privatized forms of corruption’ (Lambsdorff, 1999: 2) that have 
the advantage of not being counted as corruption but are not connected to better 
governance. Another example of a perverse effect is that governments interested 
in improving their ranking for fear of losing foreign investments will be ‘doing the 
document rather than doing the doing’ (Ahmed, 2007) and, for instance, create ‘a 
Commission for the Modernisation of the Civil Service’ without dealing with the 
underlying structural causes of corruption (Urra, 2007). 
Discussion 
In this article we have shown that there are valid reasons to doubt the effectiveness 
of ranking and benchmarking in improving policy making in terms of effectiveness 
and accountability. All of them have to do with the political, power-based logic 
underneath the construction and application of these instruments. This section 
brings together our findings in the field of European gender equality policies and 
global anti-corruption policies. 
First, best practices hamper rather than promote good performance, because 
their link to performance quality is equivocal. Past reputation tends to be rewarded 
without taking into account the context-specific character of any ‘best’ practice. 
Accordingly, best practices discourage states with other practices to improve their 
performance, as their practice is not recognised, while best practices enable those 
with the ‘right’ style to do window-dressing without incentivising performance 
improvement. This shift favours certain states and prejudices others. In the field of 
gender equality, thanks to its tradition of pilot projects and corresponding rhetoric, 
a state such as the Netherlands will be more likely to be considered a pioneer 
than a state such as Austria with its legalistic governance style and fewer catchy 
projects – although pilot projects not necessarily result in better de facto performance 
than legal instruments. In the field of anti-corruption, market-based economies 
have an advantage over economies with high state involvement. Yet, there is no 
straightforward connection between these elements and the quality of performance. 
The former will be considered the standard to be copied, not the latter, even if 
Scandinavian states with their strong state involvement in the market display lower 
levels of corruption than the US with a low level of state involvement. We have also 
argued that states with a good reputation are in a good position to influence the 
design of new indicators, ensuring their national practice to be optimally ‘graded’ 
by these indicators, and further strengthening their reputation. Similarly, states can 
be ‘immunised’ by a good reputation. 
Second, the practice of ranking based on one-dimensional indices favours policies 
that are narrowed to quantifiable objectives, ignoring multiple linkages. The main 
criticism of legal standards was that legal implementation was too limited to realise 
complex policy goals such as gender equality or good governance. Ranking, however, 
does not remedy this problem, as it limits implementation to the quantifiable aspects 
of gender equality and good governance, and provides no information on the 
underlying causes or possible remedies of gender discrimination and corruption. 
13Ranking and benchmarking
Policy & Politics (2011) • 10.1332/030557310X550097 
This limitation to what is measurable reproduces older patterns of power-based 
data collection, in which what fits in with the mainstream has the highest chance 
of being collected. 
Third, ranking does not necessarily increase political accountability. At the global 
level, democratic control of standard-setting practices by international organisations 
is non-existent and neither are there possibilities for appeal. In the EU, negotiations 
on new legal standards to be approved by the national and European parliaments 
have been replaced by the production of seemingly depoliticised data. The latter is 
presented as a technical, a-political process in which experts determine the indices 
based on shared academic knowledge. However, it is a two-stage political selection 
process, first one of who will count as experts, and then one of negotiations between 
officials and experts in the selection of indices and the definition of targets, all 
without control by the national parliaments or the European Parliament and without 
possibility for appeal before the Court. 
Of course, the fact that indices do not correctly assess policy performance is not 
new. It is also generally admitted that every index has its drawbacks. We, however, 
argue that this is often erroneously considered to have technical causes, such as a 
lack of data or expertise, requiring a technical solution, as if more data and expertise 
could produce an objective, absolute standard and as if the academic community and 
the involved experts (femocrats, TI) have no parochial interests in the production of 
indicators. It should be recognised that the choice of an index is always a political 
decision, therefore necessitating transparency as to who decides on the choice of 
indices and which political actors are involved, so they can be held accountable for 
these decisions.  
Fourth, ranking and benchmarking imply a shift from absolute to relative and 
pioneer standards. Targets and standards are selected in terms of existing practices 
and performance is judged by peer review. This favours pioneers, while it obscures 
the goal to be attained by the laggards: is the policy objective to copy the number 
one or to attain the mean? 
Fifth, ranking lacks an actor that enforces compliance for all parties equally and has 
an interest in compliance. There is no authoritative third party for the interpretation 
and enforcement of a standard, equal for all. When ‘relative’ monitoring replaces 
‘absolute’ monitoring and compliance can only be enforced through naming and 
shaming, a mechanism is created that is based on the fallacy that states perceive 
themselves as a collective that is eager to learn and committed to finding the ‘best’ 
solution to any challenge it faces. The eagerness to learn is a necessary component 
of peer review. Assuming shared norms on harmony replaces the political arena – in 
which negotiations based on preferences and power lead to compromises – with 
a depoliticised arena in which national practices are harmoniously coordinated 
between equals. Instead, states may have a stronger interest in their joint reputation as 
‘gender-friendly states’ or ‘corruption-free Western states’ than in blaming each other. 
The costs of sanctions are thus much lower than under the enforcement mechanism. 
In sum, we contend that the politics of ranking have perverse effects on the link 
between performance and reputation. In spite of their aim to improve performance 
through the potential consequences of ranking for states’ reputations, they still may 
hinder the improvement of the quality of performance and actually impede the 
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attainment of policy goals or the increase of the transparency and legitimacy of the 
political process. 
Notes
1 CPI scores range from 10 (extremely clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).
2 Clarke (2000) and van Hulten (2007) also criticise the data collection: TI does not 
use the same sources every year; the size of the survey varies between the countries; 
and only English-language sources are used. Their criticisms further undermine the 
reliability of the index.
3 In spite of these shortcomings, the index is used by academics in cross-country empirical 
studies without questioning the quality of the data (Fjeldstad and Andvig, 2001: 64).
4 Former President Jacques Chirac and former Chancellor Helmut Kohl have been 
accused of having had a role in party financing corruption scandals (‘Chirac questioned 
in scandal from his time as Paris mayor’, New York Times, 20 July 2007; ‘German sleaze: 
the story so far’, BBC News, 17 February 2000).
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